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HEN we think about transfer payments, such as those under
Temporary Aid to Needy Families ("TANF") or Food Stamps,
we should recognize that they are negative taxes. Just like in-
come taxes, they involve cash flows between private parties and the gov-
ernment, albeit going in the opposite direction. Moreover, no less than
income tax payments, their amount is based on a measure of material
well-being.
Many economists and lawyers have understood that transfers are nega-
tive taxes at least since Richard Musgrave published his landmark trea-
tise, The Theory of Public Finance, in 1959.1 Yet the point has so little
penetrated public discourse that, even among experts, few seem to keep it
in mind when discussing such basic questions as what the marginal tax
rate structure in our country either actually is or ought to be.
Consider two truisms-or actually, falsisms-that are so conventional
as to seem almost banal. Both concern the degree of graduation of mar-
ginal rates, or the extent to which they increase with income. The first
holds that graduated marginal rates are the defining attribute of a pro-
gressive system. Thus, the renowned and still frequently cited 1953 study
by Walter Blum and Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Tax-
ation, takes as its subject the justifiability of the graduated marginal rate
structure of the income tax.2 Blum and Kalven decline, on grounds of
unfeasibility, to examine progressivity in terms of the relationship be-
tween taxes and benefits. The second widely accepted truism holds that
the United States actually has graduated marginal rates at present, in that
poor people pay the lowest marginal rates.
Neither of these two truisms is actually true. First, graduated marginal
rates are not necessary for progressivity, defined more meaningfully in
terms of the fiscal system's overall treatment of the poor and the rich.
* Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, NYU Law School. A longer version of this
article will appear as chapter 9 of Daniel N. Shaviro, Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Govern-
ment's March Towards Bankruptcy, to be published by the Cambridge University Press
2006. This article is reproduced by permission of Cambridge University Press.
1. RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC
ECONOMY (1959).
2. WALTER BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXA-
TION (1953).
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Indeed, having low marginal rates in lower income ranges may not be a
good idea even if one favors significant progressivity. Second, marginal
rates often are highest for poor people, and to a degree that might widely
be considered shocking if it were better understood. Indeed, the margi-
nal rates for some poor and near-poor individuals are so high, approach-
ing or even exceeding one hundred percent, that they create harsh
"poverty traps" that frustrate people's efforts to better their circum-
stances through work. The fact that marginal rates need not be as low as
is commonly thought near the bottom of the income distribution does not
mean that they should be anywhere near one hundred percent.
The poverty traps result from rapidly phasing out transfers, such as
TANF, Food Stamps, Medicaid, the earned income tax credit ("EITC"),
and housing subsidies. The rapidity of the phase-outs reflects the com-
mon view that only poor and near-poor people should get these transfers.
As you leave poverty, therefore, you may rapidly lose many thousands of
dollars worth of benefits, on top of also paying various positive taxes on
your earnings.
Why has a view of transfers as negative taxes, and of phase-outs as
imposing tax rates, not caught on more generally? The problem is one of
fiscal language. Transfers are labeled "spending" rather than taxes. In
addition, it is hard to dissuade people from treating as significant the for-
mally designated boundaries of particular distinct programs, even though
the whole is what really matters. Thus, it seems abhorrent for anyone
who is not poor to get "welfare," regardless of how she does overall.
It is not as if supporters of significant aid to the poor want such aid to
come at the price of creating poverty traps. Fiscal language simply makes
this ugly trade-off seem necessary, reflecting not just prevailing conven-
tions but also underlying psychological heuristics. One such heuristic is
the endowment effect, which encourages unduly distinguishing between a
dollar paid out by the Treasury and a dollar that never is paid in. An-
other is the inclination to create multiple distinct "mental accounts
through which losses and gains, including losses and gains in simple mon-
etary terms, are not fungible with each other."' 3 This way of thinking en-
courages evaluating formally distinct programs separately, as an intuitive
preference rather than simply because the broader picture requires more
information.
II. WELFARE VERSUS CASH GRANTS: IS THE DISTINCTION
PURELY SEMANTIC?
A. WELFARE FOR BILL GATES??
I would not want to be the brave politician who proposed a welfare
program under which Bill Gates got benefits. The awkwardness of mak-
ing such a proposal is one reason why George McGovern was so widely
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 6 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
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mocked and condemned, during the 1972 presidential campaign, when he
proposed a $1,000 per person "demogrant."'4 It did not help McGovern,
in trying to fend off accusations of far-left quackery, that his idea had
features in common with a "Family Assistance Plan" that President Nixon
had been promoting within the past year.5 Nor did it help that
demogrants or similar benefits had been endorsed, not only by the liberal
economist James Tobin,6 but by such conservative icons as Friedrich
Hayek,7 George Stigler,8 and Milton Friedman.9 Part of the problem was
that the McGovern campaign had not thought through the plan very well
before unveiling it. Another problem, to which I will return shortly, is
that the idea of a universal guarantee raised concern about rewarding and
encouraging idleness, and ran afoul of the widely held belief that people
who decline to work do not deserve support.
It nonetheless is worth asking the full question on the merits: should
Bill Gates get welfare benefits?
"Obviously not," one might be inclined to answer. But the correct an-
swer is that it does not matter, if we care about the fiscal system's effects
as a whole, rather than about the functioning of particular formally desig-
nated parts. What is more, the question of whether Gates should get the
benefits is hard to make sense of, when even the question of whether he
actually does get them can only be answered formalistically.
Starting with the point that it does not matter, suppose we have two
choices. The first is to deny Gates welfare benefits while keeping his cur-
rent tax liability constant. The second is to give him $5,000 of welfare
benefits, but simultaneously to increase his taxes by $6,000. Does anyone
really think that the second alternative unfairly benefits him relative to
the first, given that it leaves him $1,000 worse off? And, if one is con-
cerned about "cutting [him] that completely unneeded check" 10-al-
though why this should matter, in today's world of electronic
transactions, is unclear-would it help if the welfare benefits were simply
credited against his income tax liability? Then he would be directly "get-
ting" the benefits in one sense, since there would be a line on his tax
return crediting them, but not in another, since he would never actually
receive a $5,000 check.
In what sense, however, does Bill Gates currently not get welfare bene-
fits? We can be certain that he does not go to see a caseworker at the
Department of Social and Health Services in the state of Washington,
requesting TANF cash benefits, and that if he did go, his prospects of
4. Editorial, McGovernomics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1972, at 36.
5. See Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public
Assistance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 847, 868 (2002).
6. See James Tobin, The Case for an Income Guarantee, 4 PUB. INT. 31, 36-38 (1966).
7. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 133 (1944).
8. See George Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 AM. ECON.
REV. 358, 365 (1946).
9. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191 (1962).
10. Fred Block, Why Pay Bill Gates?, in WHAT'S WRONG WITH A FREE LUNCH? 86
(Phillipe Van Parijs ed., 2001).
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establishing eligibility would be slim. In a formal or literal sense, there-
fore, he indeed does not receive welfare benefits.
Gates does, however, lose out on various benefits because his income
and assets are too high. After all, he presumably would be eligible for
welfare benefits if he and his wife, along with their three young children,
had nothing at all. This means-related loss of benefits could alternatively
be accomplished, without changing either gross or net cash flows, by re-
structuring his income tax return so that he both (1) got a tax credit for
the full benefit that he would have received with zero income and assets,
and (2) was subject to a "welfare phase-out tax," collected via the income
tax return although using the welfare system's measure of means, and
equaling the full amount of the credit.
To make this look a bit more like existing welfare, we might add one
further administrative detail that would make no substantive difference.
We could have the state of Washington provide that anyone who does not
go to see a Department of Social and Health Services caseworker is none-
theless allowed the welfare tax credit, but is conclusively presumed to
owe a welfare phase-out tax that equals the full credit. Moreover, we
could provide that those who did come in to see a caseworker would not
only avoid this presumption, but could elect to get a check for any net
cash that was due, rather than having to claim a refundable credit from
the income tax authorities.
If the means test for welfare benefits were conformed to the federal
definition of taxable income so that the same computation governed both
systems, it would be even simpler to re-describe Bill Gates as a recipient
of welfare benefits. Now the tax credit for welfare benefits at zero in-
come could simply be offset by higher marginal rates in the lower income
echelons, without requiring a distinct "welfare phase-out tax" based on a
different income measure. So the only observable instruments would be
the income tax with its restated rates, the refundable welfare tax credit,
and the rule requiring application to a caseworker for direct payment.
Under this system, Bill Gates would apparently be getting welfare ben-
efits as under the McGovern demogrant, rather than not getting them as
under present law. Yet nothing about his overall treatment by the fiscal
system would actually have changed.
B. WHAT SHOULD THE GRANTS BE CALLED?
The idea that Friedrich Hayek, George Stigler, Milton Friedman, James
Tobin, Richard Nixon, George McGovern, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan
(the principal architect of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan) all advocated
goes by a number of different names. The leading terms, some of which
only describe particular variants, include not only "demogrant" but "ba-
sic income," "guaranteed income," and "negative income tax." As Tobin,
Joseph Pechman, and Peter Mieszkowski explained:
These proposals can be described and compared in terms of two
identifying features: the basic allowance which an eligible individual
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or family may claim from the government, and the offsetting tax
which every recipient of the basic allowance must pay on his other
income. The net benefit to the recipient is the basic allowance less
the offsetting tax.1
In lieu of any of these terms, I will use the admittedly imperfect term
"cash grant" for several reasons. The terms "demogrant," "basic in-
come," and "guaranteed income" have negative political connotations,
due partly to the McGovern episode but also to their apparent implica-
tion that everyone should get the grant. This runs afoul of the view that,
as critics of the Family Assistance Plan argued, we should not use cash
grants "to show able-bodied people how they can avoid going to work.' 12
"Income support" is better, except that it fails to signal the distinction
from traditional welfare.
Identifying the cash grant idea with universality is not just politically
inconvenient, but misleading. Fiscal language games are not likely to per-
mit one to dodge public aversion to giving out universal grants if that, in
fact, is what one is doing. However, the question of whether cash grants
should be universal is no different from the question of whether welfare
benefits should be universal. Either can be provided to everyone or just
to qualified individuals.
The only distinction between cash grants and welfare benefits, as I will
use the terms, is that welfare benefits are expressly means-tested, while
cash grants are not. In the case of a cash grant, the use of income or asset
tests take place only outside the formal boundaries of the program, al-
though the overall results could be exactly the same as under welfare. In
short, speaking of cash grants rather than of welfare is purely a fiscal
language change, not necessarily associated with any overall policy differ-
ence. As we will see, however, there is a reason for it.
The term "negative income tax" arguably has greater descriptive merit
than the other customary terms, including "cash grant." In addition to
not implying the universality that might or might not be a program fea-
ture, the term "negative income tax" has the descriptive virtue of empha-
sizing the symmetry between paying a net tax and getting a net benefit.13
But it not only shares in the unfortunate history of the term "demogrant,"
but is also further removed than "cash grant" from what arguably is a
better term than either: "non-income-conditioned cash grant." Such a
term seems unacceptably turgid, however. "Cash grant" as simply a
shorthand version of it.
One further problem with the term "cash grant"-shared, however, by
"negative income tax" if we think of "taxes" as necessarily involving
cash-is that certain benefits for the poor are provided in kind, or else
11. James Tobin, Joseph Pechman & Peter Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax
Practical?, 77 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1967).
12. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE
NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN 485 (1973).
13. Tobin et al., supra note 11, at 2.
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through the use of vouchers that can only be used for specified purposes.
Prominent examples include Food Stamps, Medicaid, and housing subsi-
dies. The issues raised by providing such benefits in lieu of cash 14 are
distinct from the fiscal language point being considered here. To give Bill
Gates Food Stamps clearly would matter administratively, even if he re-
mained in the same position overall due to paying extra offsetting taxes
and keeping his overall food expenditures constant. For Medicaid, which
is not simply a voucher for the purchase of $X worth of medical services,
the differences are more than just administrative. Again, however, the
choice between cash and in-kind benefits is distinct from the fiscal lan-
guage choice between "welfare" and "cash grant."'15
What "cash grant" really is shorthand for, then, is "non-income-condi-
tioned cash or in-kind grant." I trust readers will forgive me for not using
the longer term.
C. THE CASH GRANT DESCRIPTION VERSUS THE WELFARE
DESCRIPTION OF A GIVEN POLICY
To further show how formal descriptions do and don't matter, a simpli-
fied example of aid to the poor may help. Suppose the poverty line in a
given jurisdiction is defined as $20,000. Initially, there is only a thirty
percent income tax from which the poor are exempted. That is, everyone
gets a $20,000 exemption, creating a zero tax rate on income up to that
amount. Any income over that amount is taxed at thirty percent.
The legislature then decides that no one residing in the jurisdiction
should be forced to live on less than $15,000, or three-quarters of the
poverty line. This amount will be given to people with zero income. The
amount that people get will be reduced as income rises, and at some point
they will once again be paying a net tax. In addition, tax rates will have
to go up somewhere in order to finance the new benefit.
Suppose initially that the designers think of the program as conven-
tional welfare. Therefore, they conclude that only the poor should get it.
In particular, no one who is earning more than $20,000 should get it.
They might provide that, for every extra dollar a poor person earns, the
benefit is reduced by seventy-five cents. That way, the constraints of pay-
ing $15,000 to someone who earns zero and nothing to someone who
earns $20,000 are satisfied on a straight-line basis.
Suppose further that, in order to fund the benefit, the positive tax rate
must be raised from thirty percent to thirty-five percent. Effectively,
there are now two tax brackets, with marginal rates of seventy-five per-
14. See generally David F. Bradford & Daniel Shaviro, The Economics of Vouchers, in
VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES (C. Eugene Steuerle et al. eds.,
2000).
15. In-kind benefits could be provided without requiring that Bill Gates get Food
Stamps. For example, in-kind benefits could gradually be scaled back, with the lost portion
being converted into cash, as income increased, with no effect on the marginal tax rate
(which could be determined separately) except insofar as the conversion affected subjec-
tive value because not equated by recipients with the cash equivalent.
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cent on income up to $20,000 and thirty-five percent above that point.
However, the seventy-five percent bracket was not chosen through an
evaluation of proper rate structures. Rather, it was forced on the design-
ers by their decision to eliminate the benefit by the time one reaches the
poverty line.
Now suppose instead that the designers opt for a $15,000 universal cash
grant, to be funded by eliminating the zero bracket and making such
other rate increases as may be necessary. The designers might start with
a thirty-five percent rate that now applies without any exemption
amount. Unfortunately, this will not raise enough revenue given the
numbers in the first example, where the break-even tax brackets were
seventy-five percent and thirty-five percent. The designers must increase
the marginal tax rate somewhere in the income range.
One possibility would be to adopt a seventy-five percent marginal tax
rate on everyone's first $20,000 of income. If the designers do this (and
we already know from the first example that it raises the right amount of
revenue), then the two systems are identical. In both cases, everyone
pays (a) seventy-five percent of the first $20,000 of income, plus (b)
thirty-five percent of all additional income, minus (c) $15,000, with any
excess of (c) over [(a) plus (b)] being refundable by the government.
The big procedural difference is that the designers in the second case
have given themselves more freedom in setting the marginal rate struc-
ture. Rather than boxing themselves in at the start by stipulating the
maximum benefit and the point at which it must be gone, they have al-
lowed themselves to think in terms of what marginal rate structure is best,
and thus to adopt either the very same scheme or else a different one.
This greater freedom could make all the difference in the world. Sup-
pose that a seventy-five percent marginal rate is simply too high given its
incentive effects. Only the second methodology eliminates the risk of im-
posing excessive marginal rates by mistake. 16
There is a kind of sledgehammer irony to our having combined the
view that marginal rates should be progressively graduated, with using a
welfare description that invites ignoring the marginal rate effects of phas-
ing out aid to the poor. After excluding as a matter of principle the idea
that marginal rates might reasonably be higher in the low income brack-
ets, we end up not even looking at what those rates actually are. The
result has been not merely non-graduated rates, but some that are affirm-
atively confiscatory and in sharp conflict with making work pay.
16. In principle, the welfare description can be just as flexible as the cash grant
description. Suppose that the best marginal rate structure in the earlier example would
involve a fifty percent marginal rate on the first $30,000 of income and a flat thirty-eight
percent rate above that. All we would need do to get there under the welfare description is
to say that the $15,000 maximum benefit should not be fully phased out until income
reaches $30,000, and that $30,000 should also be the income tax exemption amount. Other
combinations of the phase-out rate and the income tax marginal rate could work identi-
cally, since an increase to either rate could be offset by reducing the other rate. The hard
part is getting to the right answer from an inquiry that starts by asking who should get
welfare benefits, rather than what the marginal rate structure should look like.
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D. CASH GRANTS VERSUS WELFARE IN RELATION TO
WORK INCENTIVES
Both welfare and cash-grant style proposals, such as President Nixon's
Family Assistance Plan, have been criticized at times for blunting work
incentives. This issue played an important role in the welfare reform leg-
islation enacted in 1996.17 Welfare reform, among other changes, set
strict work requirements and imposed a five-year lifetime limit on eligi-
bility for benefits18 .
Before evaluating the significance of work incentives, we must start by
clarifying what they are. When economists discuss the effects of fiscal
rules on work incentives, they generally have in mind the impact of the
rules on the net payoff from working. Hence, the higher the marginal tax
rate, the more one's incentive to work is blunted. Within this terminol-
ogy, handing someone a ten million dollar check would not be regarded
as affecting her work incentives, except indirectly if it brought about a
change in her marginal rate bracket. Those using this terminology recog-
nize, of course, that someone who had an irksome and low-paying job
would almost certainly quit if she got a ten million dollar check. This,
however, is classified as an income or wealth effect that alters her choice
under a constant set of preferences.
In popular usage, by contrast, the notion of work incentives includes
income effects. While imposing, a ninety-five percent marginal tax rate
on poor people would certainly be understood to dampen their work in-
centives, the term also would extend to giving able-bodied individuals,
who could have found jobs if sufficiently motivated, enough resources to
meet their basic needs without working. Hence, a cash grant, and cer-
tainly a universal demogrant, would be criticized in common usage for
dampening poor people's work incentives even if their marginal rates
were reduced.
Work incentives in the economist's sense matter for reasons of effi-
ciency. If Smith would be willing to pay Jones up to $10 to perform a
given task and Jones would be willing to do it so long as he got at least $7,
the deal between them would create $3 of surplus (the excess of the value
to Smith of having the task done over the disvalue to Jones of doing it).
If the deal was subject to a forty percent tax, it presumably would not get
done. The tax would have prevented the realization of this social surplus,
without anyone's benefiting (since the government gets no revenue from
a deal that fails to happen).
This analysis does not, however, apply to work incentives in the popu-
lar sense. If Jones is given enough money to meet his basic needs and
decides that he does not want to do the task even for $10, then evidently
his disvalue (given his new circumstances) now exceeds the value to
17. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2260.
18. Id.
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Smith. From this standpoint, withholding aid from able-bodied poor peo-
ple, on the ground that they will not work if their basic needs are already
met, would make no more sense than telling millionaire professional ath-
letes that they cannot retire just because they are already rich.
But this is not to say that popular concern about "work incentives" is
wrong; only that it must rest on some other ground. The claim could be
cognitive error by poor people when they are deciding whether to work.
For example, they might be thought to under value the benefits of learn-
ing to function in the workplace or of increasing their earning capacity for
the future. On the other hand, the claim might be that work has positive
externalities, such as reducing crime levels, setting better behavioral mod-
els for children, or simply relieving taxpayers of the need to provide
support.
Cash grants clearly affect work incentives in the popular sense. Just as
under the welfare definition, however, policymakers who consider this
undesirable can respond in a number of different ways. One approach
would be to limit eligibility on some basis other than income. Thus, cash
grants could be limited to a sub-class of the population that is not ex-
pected to work, such as seniors and the disabled.
Another possible limit is work requirements, as under TANF. This
makes the marginal rate analysis more complicated. A work requirement
may in effect impose a minimum income requirement for the grant, re-
sulting in a wage subsidy (a negative tax rate on earnings) in the range
where one increases one's net transfer by working. Time limits on eligi-
bility, which amount to disqualification for subsequent cash grants if
one's income for each of the requisite number of years is sufficiently low,
have similar effects.
The difficulty of drawing a clean line between income conditioning and
other types of limits on grant eligibility should not, however, obscure the
two central advantages of the cash grant description of benefits to the
poor. Again, the first of these is the attention it focuses on overall margi-
nal rates, rather than just on those associated with particular instruments
within the fiscal system. The second advantage of the cash grant descrip-
tion is its making the entire marginal rate structure a matter of deliberate
choice, without requiring extremely high rates in lower income ranges
simply as a consequence of an arbitrary constraint holding that particular
distinct benefits must be limited to the poor.
E. CASH GRANTS VERSUS WELFARE IN EVALUATING "PROGRAM
COST" AND "TARGETING" OF BENEFITS
Welfare experts have long recognized the issue of work incentives in
the economist's sense. However, the language of "spending" can affect
the apparent nature of the trade-offs in policy design, potentially encour-
aging worse policy outcomes.
If welfare is a distinct "spending" program, then slowing down a bene-
fit phase-out appears to increase the cost of the program. Thus, recall the
2006]
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earlier example in which a decision has been made to offer $15,000 to
eligible individuals with zero income, phasing down to zero when income
reaches $20,000. Such a program would have a measurable direct budget-
ary impact, equaling the cash disbursed under it plus the costs of adminis-
tration. 19 Suppose initially that changing the size of the basic cash grant
is not an option. Slowing down the phase-out, by reducing the marginal
rate in the benefit reduction range from seventy-five percent to fifty per-
cent, and thus changing the phase-out point to $30,000, would substan-
tially raise the program's direct budgetary cost.
Under a cash grant description, "program cost" would not in this sense
be an issue. We would simply be changing net taxes and net grants for
people in various income groups. In particular, people earning zero to
$20,000 would gain financially and have their marginal rates reduced,
while those earning from $20,000 to $30,000 would gain financially but
have their marginal rates increased. Those earning more than $30,000, if
their taxes were increased to pay for the change, would lose financially
and might also experience an increase in their marginal rates. This is an
important set of changes, but calling it a "spending increase" encourages
a false analogy to, say, increasing highway spending, which directly
changes the mix of the assets in the society rather than simply shifting
dollars and marginal rates around between groups.
If the only available choice lies between a seventy-five percent phase-
out and a fifty percent phase-out of a fixed $15,000 grant, few advocates
of aid to the poor are likely to have any objection to shifting from the
former to the latter. After all, reducing the phase-out rate to fifty percent
is a win-win proposition so far as the poor and near-poor are concerned.
Suppose instead, however, that the size of the cash grant is also in play.
Under this scenario, shifting to the slower phase-out would imply making
the cash grant smaller if the "program size" (that is, the maximum feasi-
ble financial impact on higher-income taxpayers) is fixed. It would thus
favor the near-poor relative to the poor, worsening the "targeting" of aid
to the poorest individuals. While the trade-off is clear, and generally
rightly understood even under prevailing fiscal language, it might be eas-
ier to avoid politically if the choice were framed as involving distribution
between all groups rather than as higher versus lower "government
spending."
Looking at the problem this way helps to show how misguided it is to
assume that progressive fiscal systems must have graduated marginal
rates. The goal of keeping poorer people's marginal rates lower than
those of richer people, without regard to the size of the cash grant at the
bottom, completely ignores one of the two key distributional variables.
Why should the marginal rates that happen to be imposed at the middle
and top of the income distribution have any bearing on how one resolves
19. There might also be indirect budgetary effects by reason of changes to people's
work decisions.
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the trade-off at the bottom between providing an adequate minimum and
avoiding excessive work disincentives?
III. ACTUAL MARGINAL RATES IN THE U.S. FISCAL
SYSTEM FOR POOR AND NEAR-POOR INDIVIDUALS
The marginal rates faced by poor and near-poor individuals are of in-
terest even if one rejects the need for rate graduation. Marginal rates
determine how much extra economic reward one gathers, after account-
ing for the effects on taxes and transfers, by reason of earning more.
This, in turn, matters for both incentive and distributional reasons. It af-
fects work effort insofar as people respond to economic rewards, and it
determines the extent to which high earners do better than low earners.
Unfortunately, the marginal rates that poor and near-poor individuals
face are hard either to determine or summarize concisely for a number of
different reasons, including the following:
1) Interstate variations-Programs that aid the poor, although subject
to extensive federal law and regulation, are in many key respects (includ-
ing benefit levels and phase-out rates) set at the state level. As a result,
there are at least fifty different sets of marginal rate structures that a
given household could face, depending on where it is situated, and more
to the extent of intrastate variation between localities.
2) Different household types-Benefits are highly sensitive to house-
hold characteristics, such as the number of adults and/or children. In gen-
eral, aid to the poor is far more generous for households with children
than to those without. Given the belief that rapid phase-out is necessary,
this causes households with children, though treated more favorably, to
face much higher marginal rates, since much larger benefits are being
phased out over what remains a compressed income range.
3) Variation in program design-Even when different programs are de-
signed in similar ways, such as to increase benefits with the number of
dependent children and to phase out benefits as income rises, there are
often significant differences in their details, reflecting that they may have
been separately designed by different people at different times. Thus,
such important details as who is included in a given household and how
income or assets are measured may vary between programs, leading to
even more of an individualized polyglot of rate structures.
4) Differences in take-up or participation rates-Eligible individuals
often do not participate in a given program, whether due to lack of infor-
mation, discouragement by procedural hurdles, or simply personal prefer-
ence. In addition, income-conditioned federal housing subsidies, which
can provide substantial benefits, are rationed, with the consequence that
not all equally eligible households receive them. 20 Non-participation in a
20. Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income Households, 84
TAX NoTs 1191, 1194 (1999).
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program lowers one's benefit, but also one's marginal rate in the phase-
out range.
5) Accrual of Social Security benefits-While Social Security payroll
taxes, which have no exemption for low-earners, are among the positive
inputs to marginal rates, Social Security benefits are in effect a wage sub-
sidy. Retirement benefits generally increase with earnings in one's thirty-
five highest earning years that are subject to the Social Security tax.
Should we therefore not include the full Social Security payroll tax when
determining low-earners' marginal rates, at least for earning years that
are likely to be among one's top thirty-five? In part, this depends on
whether we are interested, for a given purpose, in actual net taxes paid on
a lifetime basis, or in the perceived marginal rates that people use when
making labor supply decisions. When we are interested in perceived
rates, there is an argument for ignoring the accrual of retirement benefits,
on the view that people generally do not understand it.21 Or, they may
apply too high a discount rate, reflecting the myopic lack of concern
about one's retirement resources that is a key reason for our having So-
cial Security to begin with. By contrast, distributional outcomes depend
on actual, not perceived, tax rates.
6) Other misperceptions-The question of how perceived marginal
rates compare to actual rates is not limited to Social Security. For many
benefits, most people probably lack any detailed understanding of how
the income phase-outs work. This lack of understanding could cause per-
ceived marginal rates to be either higher or lower than actual ones. For
example, perceived rates might be higher when people mistakenly believe
that they will lose Medicaid benefits immediately upon phasing out of
TANF, rather than after a twelve-month delay.22 Or, going the other
way, they "may not recognize the work incentives built into the EITC,
since nearly all receive their payments as a lump sum based on their work
during the prior year."'2 3
7) The choice of income range for measuring marginal rates-Marginal
rate tables typically show the extra net tax associated with each extra
dollar of earnings. What really matters, however, for both incentive and
distributional purposes, is the set of choices that people actually face.
Thus, suppose that one's only work options were to spend the entire year
either in a part-time job, which paid the federal minimum wage (currently
$5.15 per hour) for twenty-five hours per week, or in a full-time job that
paid the same hourly rate for forty hours. One's only choices, therefore,
assuming a fifty-week work year, would be to earn $0, $6,437.50, or
$10,300. Under these circumstances, only the marginal rates between the
21. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Jeffrey Sachs, It's High Time to Privatize, 15 BROOKINGS
REV. 16, 17 (1997).
22. NORMA B. COE ET AL., DOES WORK PAY: A SUMMARY OF THE WORK INCENTIVES
UNDER TANF 5 (1998).
23. Id. at 6.
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three possible end points would matter, as opposed to those for any given
extra dollar between the end points.
While this example may be too restrictive, workers often do not have
the full range of dollar-by-dollar choices that typically are portrayed on
economists' labor supply graphs. Job opportunities may be limited, and
may involve weekly or annual time requirements that are not freely nego-
tiable. Thus, if work choices tend to group at particular broad margins,
such as those between full-time and half-time minimum wage work, at-
tention should focus on the marginal rates that apply to these broad
ranges, and the dollar-by-dollar picture may not really be what matters.
8) The choice of time period for measuring marginal rates-A final dif-
ficulty in determining relevant marginal rates concerns the choice of time
period. Thus, consider the rule under which one may lose Medicaid ben-
efits twelve months after leaving the welfare rolls. A rational and well-
informed worker would disregard this future loss of benefits if she did not
expect to be off welfare for the full twelve months. Suppose, however,
that she is considering a significant life change that might keep her per-
manently off Medicaid once the grace period has passed. Under these
circumstances, the pending loss of what may be extremely valuable
healthcare benefits (especially if she has several children and her em-
ployer would not offer health insurance coverage) may be important de-
spite the grace period. The time frame people use is hard to discern,
however.
Despite all these issues, several studies have tried to measure the mar-
ginal rates that low-income households face. The general pattern is low
rates at the very bottom, which rapidly become extremely high, com-
monly exceeding seventy percent or even one hundred percent over sig-
nificant ranges, and that may not decline to more normal levels until well
past the official poverty line. 24
Due to a lack of integrated data concerning the application of both tax
and transfer programs, marginal rate studies have generally relied on ap-
plying the rules on the books to actual or simulated households. In 2005,
however, Stephen Holt, making use of integrated Wisconsin data,
presented a study, based on extensive data from actual poor and near-
poor households, that is the first of its kind.25
The "good" news, such as it is, from the study is that marginal rates for
low-income households often fall short of the stratospheric levels sug-
gested by simulations, due to widespread non-participation by poor
households in benefit programs for which they are likely to be eligible,
eliminating the effect of the phase-outs. Thus, consider single parents
with two children and incomes under $18,000, who were highly likely to
be eligible for all five of the income support programs in the study
24. See Shaviro, supra note 20; LINDA GIANNARELLI & EUGENE STEUERLE, THE
TWICE-POVERTY TRAP FACED BY AFDC RECIPIENTS (1995).
25. STEPHEN D. HOLT, MAKING WORK REALLY PAY: INCOME SUPPORT AND MARGI-
NAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AMONG LOW-INCOME WORKING HOUSEHOLDS (2005).
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(TANF, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and Wisconsin's distinctive health insur-
ance and subsidized childcare programs). Within this population, eight
percent participated in none of the programs, and fewer than a third par-
ticipated in more than three. 26
Needless to say, non-participation by eligible households is not actually
good news, if they have been made eligible for a reason. Even wholly
voluntary non-participation, such as out of a sense of self-reliance, can
have effects on children who were not the ones deciding to opt out. It is
even less benign if resulting from administrative obstacles, lack of infor-
mation, or fear of stigma associated with being a claimant. Where
broader participation is not considered desirable, curtailing eligibility
would be a more straightforward way of accomplishing it.
For households that participate in all of the transfer programs, the re-
sulting overall marginal rates through the phase-out ranges can be stag-
gering. Consider a single parent in Wisconsin with two children who
participates in all five of the programs, as well as claiming the federal and
Wisconsin EITCs, and whose annual income increases from $15,000 to
$35,000. This is an example of what we might ordinarily think of as es-
caping poverty through hard work and self-improvement. Such an in-
crease in income would result if the single parent moved from a full-time
job (defined as two thousand hours per year) paying $7.50 per hour to
one paying $17.50 per hour. According to the Wisconsin data, this would
not increase the household's net disposable income. In other words, the
marginal tax rate for such a household, for the range from $15,000 to
$35,000 as a whole, is one hundred percent if the parent takes care to
participate in all relief programs for which the household is eligible. Re-
sults are similar for other households at typical margins.27
These results pertain only to one state, and would probably be less dire,
from the marginal rate standpoint, in states that offer less generous bene-
fits than Wisconsin. In at least one respect, however, Wisconsin's margi-
nal rates on poor and near-poor households may be unusually low.
Wisconsin mitigates the marginal rate effect of losing Medicaid benefits
when one's income rises above the threshold by offering more gradually
phased-out, income-conditioned health insurance for children.
Insofar as the Wisconsin data is nationally representative, however, it is
clear that, when poor and near-poor households participate in multiple
programs that are meant to help them, they may face marginal rates that
far exceed acceptable levels. The effect on behavior remains uncertain,
given that a lot of the marginal rate effects are hard for people to figure
out. However, empirical studies suggest that poor households do indeed
respond to economic incentives created by the fiscal system. 28 People
26. Id. at 5.
27. The marginal rate is roughly one hundred percent for a single parent household
with one child when its income increases from $20,000 to $30,000, and for a two-parent,
two-child household when its income increases from $20,000 to $35,000. Id. at D-4, D-5.
28. See, e.g., Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Behavioral Responses to Taxes: Lessons
from the EITC and Labor Supply (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
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might respond even without understanding how all the rules work if they
observe, for example, that hard-working neighbors do not seem to be do-
ing much better than those who work less.
Why do we have marginal rates in the neighborhood of one hundred
percent across broad swathes of income in the lower ranges, when almost
no one would openly advocate such rates? Fiscal language is unlikely to
be the sole cause. The fact that so many different programs, even just on
the transfer side, are designed and operated separately without full coor-
dination may also play a role. In addition, there is a political explanation
for the pattern, if those on the very bottom of the economic ladder are
the most appealing cases for support and voters are reluctant to pay more
in order to help those who are just a bit higher up. Lowering marginal
rates for people who are beginning to escape poverty would likely require
either giving smaller grants at the bottom or raising marginal rates for
people above the near-poor income level. Nonetheless, given the awk-
wardness of openly and explicitly imposing marginal rates anywhere near
one hundred percent, it seems likely that a more integrated view of taxes
and transfers, both in general and for purposes of assessing marginal
rates, would make the existing rate structure harder to maintain.
IV. WHAT SHOULD THE MARGINAL RATE STRUCTURE
LOOK LIKE?
So far, we have seen that (1) marginal rates need not be graduated in
order for the fiscal system to be progressive, but (2) in practice they often
are much too high for poor people who participate in multiple programs.
The latter point, however, is intuitively the more salient. Marginal rates
approaching or exceeding one hundred percent are easy to dislike. On
the former point, however, even if marginal rates do not have to be grad-
uated in order for the system to be progressive, this does not tell us
whether they should be graduated.
Nearly all people favor-or think they favor-either graduated or flat
marginal rates. And even (though not exclusively) among people who
say they favor flat rates, it is common to agree that the marginal rate
ought to be zero at the very lowest income levels (for example, at the
levels needed to purchase basic necessities). So, it is worth exploring
briefly why marginal rates not only need not be, but possibly should not
be, graduated even if one favors significant redistribution from richer to
poorer individuals.
Those who support rate graduation, and who have simply failed to ap-
preciate the benefit phase-out component of actual marginal rates, often
base the argument for it on declining marginal utility, or the point that,
the more money you have, the less each dollar affects your well-being.
Thus, suppose that both Bill Gates and a single mother, who has two
11729, 2004); Bruce D. Meyer & Dan T. Rosenbaum, Making Single Mothers Work: Recent




children and is working at a minimum-wage job, were to be taxed at
thirty percent. The fact that losing thirty cents out of every extra dollar of
income would have a greater negative impact on the single mother and
her family (even if they are getting cash grants) than on Bill Gates and his
family provides a reason for favoring rate graduation.
There is a countervailing factor, however, first brought to light in the
Nobel Prize-winning work of economist James Mirrlees. 29 Everyone, and
not just poor people, is subject to the tax rate at low income brackets.
The overall tax paid by Bill Gates, for example, depends on the marginal
rates that apply to each dollar of his income, from the first to the last.
Having a low marginal rate in lower income brackets, therefore, has a
huge revenue impact. But, it has a relatively small distortionary impact
on behavior, because people in higher brackets face a different set of in-
centives at the margin. If I am earning one million dollars, for example,
none of the alternative payoffs I may consider is likely to be affected by
the marginal tax rate for income levels under several hundred thousand
dollars.
Inquiry into optimal rate structures, given these sorts of considerations,
has prompted an entire genre in public economics research, known as the
optimal income tax literature.30 While this literature, not surprisingly,
yields varying results, it often finds that "optimal marginal tax rates will
be high at the bottom of the income scale (and possibly higher than at
middle or upper levels of income). ' 31 High at the bottom does not, how-
ever, mean approaching one hundred percent. Rather, low-income mar-
ginal rates tend to be in the forty to sixty percent range, although some
specifications lead to their being below thirty percent or above eight
percent. 32
In sum, to say that marginal rates ought generally to be graduated is a
bit like prescribing penicillin before examining the patient. Marginal
rates are a technical detail, albeit an important one, in designing the fiscal
system, and are best evaluated in combination with other features, such
as the transfers available at the bottom, as well as the tax base to which
the rates apply. Rates approaching one hundred percent are unlikely to
be desirable at any margin or range where significant numbers of people
are actually making work decisions. However, relative rates, which is the
concern raised by interest in rate graduation, are of little independent
interest, other than as a technical design detail.
29. James Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REV. OF ECON. STUD. 175 (1971).
30. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON.
PERSP. 157, 163-66 (1990).
31. Louis KAPLOW, COLLOQUIUM ON TAX POLICY AND PUBLIC FINANCE, OPTIMAL
INCOME TRANSFERS 8 (2005), http://www.nyu.edu.adv/colloquia/taxpolicy/kaplow.pdf.
32. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Marginal rates are frequently analyzed based solely on taxes, without
regard to benefit phase-outs that have exactly the same incentive and dis-
tributional effects as increasing positive taxes. In part, this myopia re-
flects the differing professional specializations of income tax and welfare
experts, along with the difficulty of determining the marginal rate effects
of programs with differing tax or phase-out bases and that are subject to
significant interstate variation. It also, however, reflects the notion,
rooted in our current fiscal language, that "taxes" and "spending" are
fundamentally different.
Proposals to adopt an explicitly integrated fiscal system are often called
demogrant or negative income tax proposals. These proposals appear to
have no chance of enactment, partly because of their history but also be-
cause many people are uncomfortable with the notion of handing out uni-
versal and unconditional cash grants. The question of who should get
income support, however, is distinct from that of how we should think
about marginal rates. Cash grants can be conditional or selective, just as
welfare benefits can be offered to everyone. The case for integrated
thinking about the fiscal system has no necessary implications for the pol-
icies we should follow. It just permits better understanding of any given
set of policies.
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